DISCUSSION: The commission and authorities tasked with oversight on competition have a significant duty of imposing the EU competition law. The main concern is the magnitude of the private enforcement to supplement the public implementation of competition law. Public enforcement arises in an instance where the appellants take their disagreements to arbitration or a domestic court. In the case of Attheraces v British Horse Racing Board, the decision by the chancery is valuable in illustrating the private enforcement of the EU competition law in member state court. The discourse explores why the decision by the court is valuable in illustrating the use of private enforcement as provided in the EU competition law. The case of Attheraces v British Horse Racing Board was a crucial impartial deed by the Attheraces (ATR) without the contribution to the competition authority. As a presenter, ATR needed pre-race information about the horse races in Britain that was owned by the British Horseracing Board (BHB), responsible for regulating and administration of the British Horseracing. ATR sought availing the race data to the bookmakers located overseas. It alleged BHB inappropriately benefited from its position as the dominant data provider because it threatened to stop streaming pre-race data and charge discriminatory and unfair prices. Using Article 102 of the TFEU, the high court held BHB as liable for abusing its position as the dominant supplier by asking for discriminatory and excessive charges to supply pre-race data to ATR. The decision by the court is important as it strengthens the notion that private and public enforcement compliments one another. In the EU, authorities of competition law lack adequate resources that can help in investigating every case alleged to infringe the competition law. The commission desired the national courts to utilize Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU to relieve the burden of enforcement to help clarify and develop law, attain corrective justice by compensating victims and deter violation of the law (Akman, 2016). The law provides the powers of the national courts and their cooperation with the commission to apply the EU competition law. Nevertheless, private enforcement is said to be unnecessary as a supplementary enforcement mechanism and a way of achieving corrective justice. Arguably, public enforcement is an integrally superior and inexpensive mechanism that ensures the competition law is not violated and that the private enforcement serves the required corrective justice. Those supporting private enforcement have cautioned against releasing the culture of excessive litigation. Only a few cases private enforcement have been taken to national courts because of risk and cost involved, the complexity of evidence gathering, lengthy proceeding, and limited national courts with experience of handling competitive arguments forcing parties to settle issues outside the court as in the case of ATR v BHB. The chancery court decision on the case provides a valued model on the private enforcement of the EU competition law within courts of member states. Private enforcement significantly implicates the use of the competition law of the EU. It procures people that violated the competition law in the process of enforcement. It also helps in getting rid of the enforcement pressures on the authorities of public enforcement and raises respect for and awareness of competition law. Nonetheless, the argumentative approach of the private proceedings combined with inadequate expertise by the national courts and unavailable legal remedies, negatively affect the involved parties. Therefore, the EU member states need to improve the national legal systems that ensure victims with anti-competitive behaviors are fully compensated for reporting private action that violates the competition law. BIBLIOGRAPHY P Akman, The Tests of Illegality Under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (2016) 61 (1) The Antitrust Bulletin 84-104 A Bates, Abuse of dominance by excessive prices: how much is too much? (2008) [online]
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